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The Morales Era
The election of Juan Evo Morales Ayma in 2005, after a period of significant political
upheaval—which resulted in the fall of two presidents between 2003 and 2005—was
heralded by indigenous groups, social movements, and the global left as a true turning point
in Bolivian history. There were high expectations that the first indigenous president of a
majority indigenous Andean society would once and for all turn the page on a legacy of
oppression by domestic elites, exploitation by foreign financial and industrial interests, and
the encroachment of imperialist powers in the country’s national affairs. He would be a
champion of the left, of the poor, and of the environment. Hugo Chávez himself proclaimed
Morales as “an emissary sent by God.”1
Indeed, in the eleven years of his tenure, Bolivia has made significant strides towards
greater economic equality, its GINI score dropping below those of neighboring countries.
The extreme poverty rate has been cut in half, and significant reductions have been seen in
the overall poverty rate as well—though not quite as impressive. The Bolivian economy has
seen consistent growth during his presidency, outperforming the rest of the region even as
neighboring economies have begun to sputter. Prudent fiscal policy has resulted in very large
reserves, which has allowed the state to continue functioning even as the price of its main
export (natural gas) has plummeted.2
On balance, then, the Morales era has been regarded by many as one of great success
and progress for a country that has consistently been among the very poorest in the region.
However, the picture that is all too often painted is one that is not only not quite accurate in
crediting Morales with these outcomes, but also one that does not quite capture the potentially
very serious challenges ahead.
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The Gas Wars
It is perhaps a singular irony that it was the discovery of very large deposits of natural gas in
the Bolivian subsoil that was to prompt a period of unprecedented political turbulence,
ultimately unseating two successive presidents and resulting in the election of a coca farmer
to the country’s highest office. It is a further irony that the cause for which Morales was
elected—the nationalization of the hydrocarbons sector—aimed precisely to undo the very
thing that had resulted in the discovery of these previously unknown deposits.
It was the partial privatization and breakup of the arthritic NOC, YPFB, in 1996 that
resulted in new exploration and the very quick discovery of several very large deposits of
natural gas between 1997 and 2000. The big question became how best to use this new bounty
to boost the country’s economic development. To that end, President Jorge Quiroga launched
a plan in 2002 to export the gas to California, which at the time was suffering significant
shortages of natural gas and where the gas would net very good profits.3 This plan, centered
around a consortium known as Pacific LNG, would involve the construction of a pipeline to
the Chilean coast, where the gas would be liquefied prior to export to its final destination.
The deal was estimated to net the country some USD 21 billion.4
This plan was not well received by the Bolivian population and led to widespread
protests and the breakdown of the political establishment in relatively short order. In a
nutshell, the root cause behind Bolivian resource nationalism must be sought in the deeply
and widely held belief that the crushing poverty of Bolivian society, even though the country
possesses vast natural resources, can be explained only as the result of vicious exploitation
by foreign interests, most notably Spain, Great Britain, and the United States. In that context,
the very notion that this newly discovered source of potential wealth would once again be
exported by private companies to serve foreign interests was regarded as completely
3

unacceptable. To make matters worse, the very thought of Bolivian gas being processed in
Chile, in a region that Bolivia claims as its own, to be exported to the United States, where it
would keep the wheels of U.S. industrialism churning was anathema to very large sections
of the Bolivian population.5
It was not Jorge Quiroga who would pay the political price for his initiative, but his
successor, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, who was elected president in 2002—only just
defeating Evo Morales, who at that time was still running primarily as the representative of
the cocalero movement. As the plan was further developed, protests broke out that effectively
paralyzed the Bolivian economy. On a number of occasions, these protests were met with
force, resulting ultimately in scores of deaths. Meanwhile, Evo Morales managed to rise to
prominence as a principal leader in the movement against the plan, arguing vociferously for
the renationalization of Bolivian hydrocarbons. In effect, what Morales accomplished was
the marriage of the cocalero movement with a more ideological and economically based antiimperialist movement.6
In 2003, Sánchez de Lozada resigned as a result of the protest and was succeeded by
vice-President Carlos Mesa Gisbert, who promised to abstain from violence and who
instituted a referendum on the nationalization of Bolivian hydrocarbons. Further tax increases
and partial renationalization in 2005 were not enough to placate the masses, ultimately
leading Mesa to declare the country ‘ungovernable’ and to subsequently resign. It was during
the following elections that Evo Morales accomplished what he could not in 2002, and was
duly elected to the highest office.
It is worthy of mention here that even though it is Morales who is credited with the
renationalization of hydrocarbons and the reincorporation of the old YPFB, these were
effectively accomplished during the tenure of Carlos Mesa. Morales signed the decrees that
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enacted reforms demanded under the 2004 referendum. He did, however, meet popular
demand by insisting on the renegotiation of existing export agreements with Brazil and
Argentina—the main consumers of Bolivian natural gas—demanding higher prices for the
gas that flows to both countries. Moreover, he dramatically raised both taxes on the extraction
of natural gas as well as royalties received by the state to a total of up to 82% of the value at
the wellhead, thereby very significantly propping up the treasury.7
What Has It Meant
Given that extractive industries—and certainly the Bolivian hydrocarbons sector—tend to
function as economic enclaves, the increased royalties and taxes extracted by the Bolivian
state have resulted primarily in a windfall for the state itself. Government receipts from the
extraction and sale of natural gas have significantly boosted revenues and now constitute
nearly a third of total receipts, producing record setting surpluses. However, the insular
nature of the sector itself means that it is not capable of creating employment on any sizeable
scale nor does it necessarily create supportive industries which might in turn generate
employment. In this sense, the hydrocarbons sector in Bolivia functions not unlike the tin
mines of old, which long constituted the largest single portion of state revenues.8
Regardless of the staunch anti-imperialist rhetoric employed by Morales himself, his
administrations have remained fairly conservative when it comes to fiscal policy. Bolivia has
built up comparatively massive reserves of both gold and currency, enough to sustain it
through a prolonged depression in the price of oil. Social programs have been successful, but
really quite limited in scope. These have consisted of a set of direct subsidies, such as the
Renta Dignidad (for pensioners), the Bono Juancito Pinto (for poor children of school age),
and the Bono Juana Azurduy (for mothers and infants), as well as significant increases in the
minimum wage.9
5

These programs certainly have been successful in reducing the poverty rate, and
especially the rate of extreme poverty—which has been cut more than in half between 2000
and 2014. It is interesting to note that since these programs targeted the poorest segments of
society, one of the effects has also been to effectively reduce the inequality rate as measured
by the GINI coefficient, so that Bolivia now scores better than many of its neighbors, whereas
in 2005 it was still the worst performer on the continent. Likewise, the rate of malnutrition
has fallen, as has the infant mortality rate, thus producing a nice increase in life expectancy.
However, it must be noted that these trends towards improved standards of living and falling
poverty rates constitute a continuation of a process that had been underway prior to Morales’s
ascent to power. Similarly, the direct subsidies or transfers, while expanded significantly
during his tenure, were not in and of themselves a novelty: the Renta Dignidad itself is a
continuation of the earlier Bonosol.10
These are, however, fairly minimalistic interventions. The more important
observation is that beyond simple and conservative measures to reduce poverty and improve
the lives of the poor and working poor, the tenure of Mr. Morales has not been marked by
any significant effort to address the fundamental failings that underlie the historically poor
economic performance of the country: it has been the state’s windfall that has allowed the
state to effectively mask the consequences of a profoundly dysfunctional system, yet without
addressing the root of this dysfunction itself.
There have been few efforts to bolster diversification of the economic system other
than a handful of projects that seek to further monetize Bolivian natural gas, such as the
recently inaugurated liquids separation plant that has allowed Bolivia to become selfsufficient in LNG. As before, Bolivia remains entirely dependent on its extractive
industries—hydrocarbons, but also zinc and a variety of other strategic minerals—and large6

scale agriculture (mainly soy), while remaining just as dependent upon imports for
manufactured goods. This is a strategy that has historically not served Bolivia well.
Indeed, it can be argued that the Bolivian government remains still the single greatest
obstacle to diversification of the country’s economy, as there has been no effort in the past
decade to reduce the overall unfriendliness of the Bolivian state to entrepreneurship and
investment—in any sector other than the extractive one. Bolivia consistently scores at or near
the very bottom with regard to ease of doing business—for some data points, Bolivia is the
worst performer of any country in the world11—which in turn helps explain the persistent
importance of the informal market—which is where income and employment gains have
been primarily located during the recent gas boom.12 That is to say that the current climate
remains outright hostile to entrepreneurship, actively hampering the ability of the Bolivian
economy to transform its gains from natural gas into long-term and sustainable economic
development. The degree to which this is true is such that I would characterize the climate as
one marked by economic xenophobia mixed with overzealous bureaucracy.
The problem of corruption also continues to plague Bolivian society, although some
minor improvements can be observed. YPFB has been plagued by scandal, as have members
of Morales’s inner circle: indeed, between 2005 and 2012 of a total of six directors of the
newly reintegrated YPFB, five have been removed due to corruption.13 The fact that
consistent corruption problems within the administration has not terribly dented the public’s
faith in Morales himself should be understood as a result of the highly personalistic nature of
the Bolivian political system. This can also be seen in the exceptionally low trust that
Bolivians have in political parties and institutions.
Thus, even though it is true that Mr. Morales’s tenure has been marked by admirable
advances in the overall well-being of Bolivians, those improvements are not the result of
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systemic or even sustainable changes in the socio-economic structure of Bolivian society.
They depend on the continued generosity of the state, which in turn depends on a continued
windfall from natural gas. Meanwhile, the economic system itself remains profoundly broken
and effectively hostile to development and investment. This results in a situation in which
very real advances rest precariously on the whims of global markets and regional demand.
Challenges Ahead
Bolivia faces two major challenges in the years ahead, both of which stand to threaten
the stability and growth Bolivian society has experienced during the era of Morales’s tenure.
The first of these challenges flows from the fact that the gaseous optimism of the early
twenty-first century appears to have been misplaced. Original proven reserves placed Bolivia
in second place on the continent in terms of its exploitable hydrocarbons, triggering fantasies
of a new Bolivia that would serve as a regional energy broker. Those dreams were dashed by
the 2010 Ryder Scott certification, which adjusted proven reserves downwards significantly
enough to downgrade Bolivia to fifth place and behind both of its main consumers.14 Since
2012, new discoveries have been barely enough to maintain proven reserves at roughly the
same level of just around 10 TCF. As it turns out, Bolivian natural gas is very much a limited
resource, and the shock of the adjustment has meant that there have been lingering doubts
about Bolivia’s ability even to meet existing long-term obligations. In the absence of
significant new discoveries in the near future, Bolivian gas would run out at projected
production levels by 2023.15 In all likelihood, there will be significant further discoveries,
but the question will be whether they will be enough to maintain current production levels,
let alone increase them.
Moreover, very significant discoveries of tight oil and shale gas in Argentina mean
that once those formations come online—which is, at this time, largely a question of waiting
8

for the price of oil to reach a point at which exploitation becomes economically attractive—
there will be relatively little need for Argentina to continue to rely on imports from its stillimpoverished neighbor. While it is true that Bolivia’s conventional gas could be pricecompetitive given the lower cost of exploitation, it is also true that the willingness of
Argentina to put up with the at times irksome behavior of its northern neighbor was due in
large part to not only necessity, but also to the sympathetic stance taken by Morales’s
ideological alliance with Fernández de Kirchner. To put this in perspective, let us contrast
Bolivia’s proven reserves of 10.45 TCF with Argentina’s estimated 774 TCF in recoverable
shale gas alone.16
The Brazilian market is yet more complicated. In this case, too, the willingness of
Brazil to bow to Bolivian demands in the early years of the Morales administration was in
no small part due to the ideological position taken by Lula da Silva (and his successor, Dilma
Roussef). The very serious upheaval in Brazil resulting from the stunningly large corruption
scandal that has hit both Petrobras and the political establishment—including Lula da Silva—
is likely to alter the political arithmetic. It is important to recall that Morales’s stance towards
Petrobras at the outset of his tenure—and indeed the attitude towards Brazil of his inner
circle—did not necessarily go over very well in Brazil. For the moment, especially given the
effect that serious drought is having on Brazil’s hydropower infrastructure, Brazil does need
Bolivian gas. But Brazil’s very large untapped reserves—including nonconventional ones—
may certainly lessen that need.
The risk then is that Bolivia, rather than becoming the Qatar of the Southern Cone, is
more likely to become a very minor player in the regional energy market, its major clients
more than capable of producing the gas they need domestically and not especially inclined
politically to give in to the sort of demands made by the Bolivian government in 2006-2010.
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That is to say that even if Bolivia did manage to find sufficient reserves to maintain its current
levels of extraction for more than five to ten years, there may not be a clear market regionally
for them to export to. Given the very sizeable formations in neighboring countries combined
with a much friendlier business climate and significantly lower royalties and taxes, there is
also less of an incentive for the transnationals to invest heavily in further exploration in
Bolivia, where profits are limited and prospects less appealing.
In the meanwhile, as I have indicated earlier, the revenues from natural gas
exploitation over the past decade have not been put to use to transform the Bolivian economy
in a manner that would allow it to thrive without its natural gas reserves. Most of the industrial
projects touted by the Morales government have been tied in one way or another to natural
gas: that includes the much celebrated liquids separation plant, but also the failed Jindal
mining project—which failed precisely because Bolivia was unable to provide the gas it
promised to commit to the project.17 The most notable infrastructural improvements have
been those that provide access to further hydrocarbons—such as the recently restarted and
unpopular TIPNIS road18—or that have more of a cargo cult quality, such as the cable cars
that now connect El Alto and La Paz. While this rather expensive project really does make it
easier to travel between the two cities, the main problem of transportation of goods between
the two cities has not been addressed.
Moreover, the basic structure of the Bolivian economy remains unchanged. The
improvements in living standards, life expectancy, GDP growth, and so on should be
regarded as little more than subsidies drawn from the sale of natural gas. The economy itself
remains dominated by an enormous informal sector and the almost complete absence of
industrial development.
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It must also be noted that the heavy dependence on natural gas has led the Bolivian
government to effectively abandon the environmental grandstanding that characterized
Morales’s speechifying in earlier years, such as when Mother Earth (Pachamama) was
granted legal rights. Rather than protecting the environment or integrity of indigenous lands,
there has been a push to open the nature reserves to active exploitation of hydrocarbon
resources. Likewise, indigenous lands are being opened up to development in support of the
hydrocarbons sector, with the expected result of encroachment by loggers and farmers.19
This means that we can expect that if no sizeable discoveries of new deposits are made in
quick order, an already very aggressive approach to exploration and exploitation will
intensify, which in turn will result—as it has done already—in a breakup of the alliances of
social movements that constitute the basis upon which the current political system is built.
The reputation of the current president is built in part on his embrace of indigenous rights,
and the struggle of indigenous peoples against the might of the state. This approach will result
in an erosion of trust in Morales and the movement he represents, which is reflected indeed
in the results of the referendum of February. Likewise, his credentials as a champion of
environmentalism are sustaining very heavy damage, making it increasingly difficult for him
to profile himself and his movement as a true alternative to regular old extractivism.
Moreover, a lack of significant new discoveries would, as indicated above, result in
falling production and exports, which would in turn eat directly into the state’s ability to fund
the social programs that have been so successful in reducing poverty rates and improving
overall quality of life for ordinary Bolivians. The pressure on the state would be monumental
and in that context, we must harken back to the YPFB of old. During the 1970s, the agency
devolved into what essentially amounted to a bank for the political and military
establishment, while also serving as a source of plushy jobs for incompetent fools with good
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personal networks. By the 1980s, Bolivian wells had dried up, the country had become an
importer of hydrocarbons, and the dwindling profits of YPFB were redirected entirely to the
treasury to deal with the ensuing economic crisis.20 As a result, there was neither the drive
nor the money to engage in exploration to make up for the wells that had run dry. It was not
until the breakup and partial privatization of YPFB that this situation was reversed, and to
great success.
The reincorporation of the old YPFB should therefore be cause for some concern,
especially given the fairly frequent corruption scandals that have plagued the agency over
the past decade. That is to say that falling production of natural gas would precipitate
precisely those conditions that caused the YPFB to become what it became in the late 1970s,
an NOC incapable of fulfilling its basic functions. The plague of corruption in state controlled
companies has sadly been a bit of a constant in Bolivian history, resulting not only in a YPFB
that was incapable of performing its essential functions for decades but also a state mining
corporation (COMIBOL) that managed to turn a once profitable enterprise into a bottomless
pit that sucked money out of the Bolivian economy on a grand scale.21
Given that the advances in Bolivian society should be described as effectively
subsidies paid out to Bolivians from natural gas revenues, a permanent reduction in those
revenues would result in a very significant pressure on the state. The failure of the state to
use its windfall to bolster the ability of the economy to diversify beyond resource extraction
has meant that beyond natural gas there effectively is no plan B. There appears to have been
no long-term strategy for Bolivian development, as evidenced by the absolute refusal of the
Morales administration to address the most fundamental shortcomings of the economic
environment; those include infrastructure, corruption, and weak institutions, but above all the
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almost destructive role of the state in the economy, where its regulation appears primarily to
exist to stifle development and discourage investment.
This is in effect the greatest obstacle to the development of the best candidate for a
plan B: Bolivia’s vast lithium deposits in the Salar de Uyuni. Aside from the obvious
environmental concerns that come with the exploitation of a resource that counts as one of
the most iconic tourist attractions in the Andes, the investment climate in Bolivia remains
very hostile. Bolivia may hold the largest reserves, but not the only ones in the region, and
Bolivia’s neighbors are effectively exploiting these resources. In the Bolivian case, however,
it is both expensive and dangerous to consider heavy investments, while profits will be
limited due to the aggressive stance of the Bolivian government.
The second major challenge is the looming end of the Morales era, as the recent
referendum effectively prohibits him running for a fourth term. While he has publicly
admitted defeat, he has somewhat ominously stated that he does not consider this referendum
to be the end of the story. It will take some years until we know whether he intends to step
down or to find some method of retaining his hold on power.22
The largest problem is that there is no clear successor for Morales in the Bolivian
political arena. His party—the Movement towards Socialism—was never more than a
personal vehicle for his election, a consequence of the fact that one cannot run for office
under the Bolivian constitution other than as a member of a party. His electoral success has
been the result of his unique ability to unite various social movements, in particular uniting
small-scale coca farmers, indigenous communities, and the urban lower and lower middle
classes. This is part and parcel of the personalistic nature of Bolivian politics, but we should
be concerned that there is no current figure in Bolivian politics who is capable of uniting such
large swaths of the Bolivian electorate. It is precisely this quality, combined with the natural
13

gas boom and its benefits, that has allowed Bolivia to undergo such a lengthy period of
political stability and economic growth. That is to say that the stability of the current political
system has rested with the person of Evo Morales, and specifically not with the institutions
of the state.
Given the lack of faith of Bolivians in the state apparatus itself, and the increasing
disenchantment of indigenous movements who were at the core of Morales’s base, it is
difficult to imagine how the alliances between farmers, indigenous communities, and the
urban poor can hold. The economic model pursued by the current administration has begun
directly counter to the earlier rhetoric of environmental sensitivities and respect for the rights
of indigenous communities. As further exploration becomes a more pressing concern, these
alliances cannot survive. In the meanwhile, the trust of Bolivians in the institutions of the
state has eroded over the past decade, especially when it comes to the justice system:
Bolivians feel less protected by the system now than they did at the start of the Morales Era.
Their faith in the ability of the state to manage the natural resource bounty has also suffered
a downturn in recent years.23
In the absence of a uniting figure and continued success in natural gas exploration, it
is not at all unthinkable that Bolivia may revert to the state lamented by Morales’s immediate
predecessor, who proclaimed Bolivia to be ‘ungovernable.’24
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